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1 Introduction
Reciprocal market-sharing agreements between rms are agreements by which rms divide
up a market and agree not to enter each others territory. These agreements are under
suspicion by antitrust authorities; moreover, if after an investigation, the antitrust authority
nds proof of market-sharing agreements, the rms involved are penalized. It is the set of
these bilateral agreements that gives rise to a collusive network among rms.
The goal of the present article is to study how the presence of an antitrust authority
a¤ects the market-sharing agreements made by rms. In particular, I examine the network
structure that arises when each rm takes into account the possible penalty that exists when
a new agreement is signed.
Market-sharing agreements are perennial problems in antitrust policy. As an example,
in 1898, a group of iron pipe producers in the Mid-Western and the Western in United
States rigged prices on some markets and reserved some cities as exclusive domains of one
of the sellers. This was the Addyston Pipes Case (Scherer and Ross (1990)). More than one
hundred years later, in January 2005, related to the case of the MCAA (Monochloroacetic
Acid) chemicals cartel, the European Competition Commissioner stated "...the Commission
cannot and will not tolerate price xing and market-sharing. I will not allow companies to
carve up the Single Market amongst themselves and so deny customers the benets to which
they are entitled..."
Antitrust authorities have been particularly concerned about the potential harm of
market-sharing agreements and have spent substantial time and e¤ort attempting to de-
ter them. As a recent example in Europe, it is possible to mention the lifts and escalators
cartel operating in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In February 2007,
the European Commission ned the members of the cartel over e990 million. Between
1995 and 2004, the companies in the cartel shared markets among other anti-competitive
practices.
However, not only do transnational competition authorities devote e¤orts to discourage
this practice but national competition authorities also attempt to avoid it. For example, in
1999, the Irish Competition Authority issued cartel guidelines with the mission "to promote
greater competition...by tackling anti-competitive practices, thereby contributing to an im-
provement in economic welfare". Particularly, it points out two types of arrangements: 1)
the price-xing cartel and 2) the market-sharing cartel.
Additionally, as another very recent example, we can point to the saving bank cartel
operating in the Basque Country and in Navarra in Spain. In October 2007, the Spanish
Competition Authority (Comisión Nacional de la Competencia) ned the saving banks BBK,
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Kutxa, Caja Vital and Caja Navarra over e24 million (the second highest ne imposed by
the Spanish Competition Authority). Between 1990 and 2005, the cartels members had
agreed to carve up markets. So that, none of the saving banks in the cartel opened any
branch in the each others "traditional" territory (while conducting a remarkable territorial
expansion in other provinces, especially near the borders).
Therefore, market-sharing cartels are a current problem in antitrust policy and, as we
have seen, the antitrust authorities devote considerable e¤ort to avoiding them. This point
stresses the importance of understanding how the collusive agreements work and how they
interact with the policy that has tried to deter them in order to promote and develop a
healthy economy. This is the aim of this paper.
In particular, we assume that each rm is associated to one market, i.e., its home mar-
ket. In spite of this, each rm can enter and compete in all foreign markets. Market-sharing
agreements are modeled as bilateral or reciprocal agreements whereby rms commit to stay-
ing out of each others market. The set of these reciprocal agreements gives rise to a collusive
network among rms.
The antitrust authority is dened by a probability of inspection and by a ne which is
imposed on rms that are proved guilty of market-sharing agreements. The ne is equal to
the rms limited liability, which is assumed equal to the rms total prots.
We rst study the actual probability of being discovered in the collusive network frame-
work. We show that the probability of being caught depends on the agreements each rm
has signed. That is, the probability of rm i being detected depends not only on whether
rm i is inspected by the antitrust authority but also on whether any rm that has formed
an agreement with i, is inspected. Therefore, if a rm is inspected and a market-sharing
agreement exists, then it is detected, and the rms involved in it are penalized. However,
the rm in consideration might be detected without being inspected because any rm that
has an agreement with it was inspected.
We then provide a characterization of the stable network under the presence of the
antitrust authority. We show that the pairwise stable network can be decomposed into a
set of isolated rms and complete components of di¤erent sizes. While in the absence of the
antitrust authority a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, when the antitrust
authority is considered, the networks stability depends on the network conguration as a
whole. To understand this, the following observation is crucial. If the antitrust authority
detects a market-sharing agreement between two rms, then it will punish each rm with a
ne equal to the total prots that each rm ends up having. Thus, when considering whether
or not to enter into a market-sharing agreement, the rm must take into account that if it
is detected by the antitrust authority, it will lose not only the prots in its own market, but
also the prots in those markets in which the rm is not colluding.
This implies that the lower bound on the size of complete components depends on each
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network conguration, and on each probability of inspection. Additionally, that lower bound
may be greater than the lower bound in the absence of the antitrust authority. Nevertheless,
the set of isolated rms may enlarge. We conclude that under the presence of the com-
petition authority, more structures that are competitive can be sustained through bilateral
agreements.
Furthermore, when a strong stability notion is considered, the antitrust authority has a
pro-competitive impact. That is, as the probability of inspection increases, rms in large
components have more incentives to renege on all their agreements at once, and it might
lead to break-down collusion.
This article brings together elements from the literature of market-sharing agreements,
networks, and law enforcement. We study a particular way of collusion: market-sharing
agreements; and these collusive agreements have a key feature: they are bilateral agreements.
Therefore, we borrow from the Network literature and the Collusion literature.
Networks is currently a very active eld of research. Prominent contributions to this
literature include, among others, Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Goyal (1993), Dutta and
Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2005). In particular, in the rst,
the formation and stability of social networks are modeled when agents choose to maintain or
destroy links using the notion of pairwise stability. We follow Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)
and Jackson and van den Nouweland (2004) to characterize the stable and the strongly stable
networks.
Besides these theoretical articles, there is also more and more literature that applies the
theory of economic networks to models of oligopoly. Among others, Goyal and Joshi (2003),
Goyal and Moraga (2001), and Belleamme and Bloch (2004). The rst two are related
to the formation of bilateral agreement in order to reduce costs. Belleamme and Bloch
(2004) is closely related to the current work. They have analyzed the collusive network of
market-sharing agreements among rms, but they do not take into account the existence
of antitrust authorities. Therefore, their results may be limited under those circumstances.
They nd that, in a stable network, there exists a unique lower bound in the size of complete
components. Moreover, when that unique threshold is equal to 1, the set of isolated rms
is composed, at most, by only one rm. These results are in contrast with ours. Under
the presence of the antitrust authority, we are not able to dene that lower bound and,
ultimately, this fact implies that more competitive structure are possible to sustain in such
case.
On the other hand, network and crime is another application of network economics. Two
recent papers related with the present article are Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2003) and
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006)
Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2003) study the impact of the network structure, and its
geometric details, on individual and aggregate criminal behavior. Specically, they provide
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a model of networks and crime, where the expected cost to commit criminal o¤enses is
shaped by the network of criminal mates. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2004, 2006)
further develop this approach. As main results, they relate individual equilibrium outcomes
to the playerspositions in the network and also characterized an optimal network-based
policy to disrupt the crime. In these papers, the network formation game is analyzed. This
approach is di¤erent from ours. That is, we dispense with the specics of the noncooperative
game and we model a notion of what is stable (a xed network approach). The other
di¤erence is the kind of externalities that one link entails. In both papers, the competition
among criminals by the booty acts as a negative externality. However, they assume that
the criminal connections transmit to players (criminals) the necessary skill to undertake
successful criminal activities. Specically, the higher the criminal connections, the lower
is the individual probability of being caught. Moreover, these are in sharp contrast with
our assumptions about the externalities of signing a new agreement. Namely, we assume
that more agreements increase the "booty" as long as the individual prots are a decreasing
function in the number of active rms in the market (positive externality). By contrast, each
link entails a negative externality. As the number of agreements increases, the probability of
being discovered also increases. Furthermore, the penalty is also positively related with the
number of agreements. Therefore, one more agreement increases the expected ne imposed
by the competition authority.
Regarding the Collusion literature, after the seminal contribution of Stigler (1950) the
stability of the price-xing cartel has been extensively studied. For an excellent reference of
this literature see Vives (2001).
As we have said before, the main goal of this article is to explore the impact of the
antitrust authority on the collusive networks structure. In the vast literature of antitrust
enforcement, the following papers, among others, study the e¤ect of antitrust policy on car-
tel behavior. Block et al. (1981) is the rst systematic attempt to estimate the impact of
antitrust enforcement on horizontal minimum price xing. Their model explicitly considers
the e¤ect of antitrust enforcement on the decision of rms within an industry to x prices
collusively. They show that a cartels optimal price is an intermediate price (between the
competitive price and the cartels price in absence of antitrust authority) and this interme-
diate price depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement e¤orts and penalties.
Besanko and Spulber (1989), and Besanko and Spulber (1990) with a di¤erent approach,
use a game of incomplete information where the rmscommon cost is private information
and neither the antitrust authority nor the buyers observe the cartel formation. Instead,
they draw inferences from the observed price and decide whether or not to pursue a case.
They nd that the cartels equilibrium price is decreasing in the nes. LaCasse (1995) and
Polo (1997) follow this approach.
The interest for studying the e¤ect of the antitrust policy on the collusive behavior has
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reemerged. Harrington (2004) and Harrington (2005) explore how detection a¤ects cartel
pricing when detection and penalties are endogenous. Firms want to raise prices but not
suspicions that they are coordinating their behavior. In Harrington (2005), by assuming the
probability of detection is sensitive to price changes, he shows that the steady-state price
is decreasing in the damage multiple and in the probability of detection. However, he nds
a long-run neutrality result with respect to xed penalties. Harrington (2004) studies the
interaction of internal cartel stability and detection avoidance. One important result that
he nds is the perverse e¤ect of the antitrust law. The risk of detection and penalties can
serve to stabilize a cartel and thereby allow it to set higher prices.
In these papers, the antitrust policy is endogenous to the model and it contrasts with
the competition authority dened in this paper. We adopt an antitrust policy that is as
simple as possible, because we want to focus our e¤orts on understanding the network that
is formed once the antitrust policy is set.
Nevertheless, in a static setting when no legal errors are present (false conviction), the
penalty, assumed costless to impose, should be set as high as possible in order to deter
collusive behavior (Beckerian incentives approach). In the present paper, the punishment
equals to rmslimited liability as, for example, Besanko and Spulber.
Similar to the present article, for instance, Motta and Polo (2003), Chen and Rey (2007)
use a xed probability of inspection,1 but in a leniency program context. Specically, they
study the antitrust enforcement under leniency programs and analyze the incentives to col-
lude when the probability of detection and penalties are both xed.
On the other hand, Frezal (2006), in a dynamic setting, focuses on the study of the design
of optimal audit policy. He concludes that a deterministic and non-stationary policy, where
a given industry is controlled every T periods, may be more e¤ective than a stationary one
(where an industry is audited with a xed probability at each period).
The outline of this paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model of market-sharing
agreements and provides general denitions concerning networks. Section 3 characterizes
the stable and strongly stable collusive networks in the symmetric context. Section 4 studies
the set of pairwise stable and strongly stable networks under di¤erent levels of antitrust
enforcement. Furthermore, this section analyzes the impact of the antitrust authority over
competition. Section 5 discusses where the antitrust policy dened in this paper is in the
theory and in the practices of antitrust enforcement. In addition, it also examines some
extensions of the current research. The paper concludes in Section 6. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
1Motta and Polo (2003) initially treat the enforcement parameter as exogenous. By doing that, they focus
on the game played by rms for a given policy. After that, they analyze the optimal policy under the antitrust
authoritys constraint.
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2 The Model
2.1 Firms
The model consists of N risk neutral symmetric rms indexed by i = 1; 2; :::; N . Each rm
is associated to a market (i.e., its home market). Markets are assumed symmetric. We are
considering that each rm has incentives to enter into all foreign markets. However, rm i
does not enter into foreign market j, and vice versa, if a reciprocal market-sharing agreement
exists between them. A reciprocal market-sharing agreement is an agreement whereby two
rms agree not to enter each others territory.2
Let gij 2 f0; 1g denote the existence of an agreement between rms i and j. Thus, we
will say that rm i has signed an agreement with rm j and vice versa, if gij = 1.
Let ni be the number of active rms in market i and mi be the number of agreements
formed by rm i. That is, ni = N  mi.
Let ij () be the prots of rm i on market j. Firm i has two sources of prots. Firm i
collects prots on its home market, ii (ni), and on all foreign market where there does not
exist an agreement,
X
j;gij=0
ij (nj).
The symmetric rm and symmetric market assumptions allow us to write ij () =  ().
Therefore, total prots of rm i can be written as follows:
i =  (ni) +
X
j;gij=0
 (nj) (1)
It is assumed that rms have limited liability, i.e., i  0 is the maximum amount that
the rm could pay in case a penalty were imposed by an antitrust authority.
Properties of prot functions
This paper appeals to the same properties for prot functions as Belleamme and Bloch
(2004), henceforth BB. The prot functions satisfy the following properties:
Property 1: Individual prots are decreasing in the number of active rms in the
market,  (ni   1)   (ni)  0.
Property 2: Individual prots are convex in the number of active rms in the market,
 (ni   1)   (ni)   (ni)   (ni + 1).
2 It is assumed that these agreements are enforceable.
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Property 3: Individual prots are log-convex in the number of active rms in the
market, (ni 1)(ni) 
(ni)
(ni+1)
.
It is important to note that Property 1 is satised in the most standard oligopoly models.
In spite of the fact that Property 2 and Property 3 are more restrictive than Property 1,
BB provide su¢ cient conditions under which these properties hold in a symmetric Cournot
oligopoly context.3
2.2 The Antitrust Authority
We dene an antitrust authority (AT) as a pair f; F ()g, where  2 [0; 1) is the constant
probability that a market-sharing suit is initiated, and F ()  0 represents the monetary
penalty that a rm must pay if it is convicted of market-sharing agreements. F () is a
function that depends on the prots () that a ned rm ends up having. In fact, we
assume that the penalty will be equal to the total prots that a guilty rm ends up getting.4
The technology is such that when the AT inspects, if there exists a market-sharing
agreement, then the AT detects it. Moreover, the AT also identies the two rms involved
in the agreement. That is, if a rm is sued for making a market-sharing agreement, the AT
is assumed able to detect, without error, whether a market-sharing agreement has occurred.
Moreover, if it has occurred, the AT can detect the rms that signed that agreement. In
such a case, both rms are penalized and each one must pay F () = i.
The antitrust policy and the organization of collusive agreements
We will show how the organization of collusive conspiracy interacts with the enforcement
policy. Particularly, now, we will restrict our attention on the interaction between the
structure of illegal agreements and the probability of being detected.
To highlight this issue, let us start by analyzing what is quite standard in the antitrust
literature. Assume an AT described by f; Fg where  2 [0; 1) is the probability of a rm i
being inspected and F  0 represents the ne imposed by the AT to any guilty rm. Then,
we write the expected value of a collusive rms prots in, for example, a static setting as:
(1  ) () +  [ ()  F ] (2)
Behind this expression, two important features of enforcement policy are assumed. First,
the court system is perfect. That is, when a given collusive rm is reviewed by the AT, the
3Let P (Q) be the inverse demand function. In a symmetric Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous products,
individual prots are decreasing in n if costs are increasing and convex and E (Q) = QP
00
(Q)
P 0(Q) >  1. In this
context, Property 3 is satised if costs are linear, E (Q) >  1 and E0 (Q)  0.
4See Section 5 for a detail discussion.
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courts are able to determine without errors that a collusive behavior has occurred. In such
situation, the rm is ned with a total penalty F . Second, the court system is not able to
detect the other members in the collusive agreement. If it were, each rm, when computing
its expected collusive benets, would take into account that when other cartels members
are inspected, it will be also found guilty of collusion.
Therefore, behind the expression (2) it is assumed that the probability of being inspected
is equal to the probability of being detected.
However, moving the analysis to scenarios that are more realistic where competition
authorities are able to determine the other cartels members when they inspect, the suitable
probability that each rm must consider computing (2) is the probability of being detected.5
Given the technology of inspection assumed in the current paper, when a rm i forms a
new market-sharing agreement, it will increase its probability of being detected. That is, the
probability of rm i being caught by the AT depends not only on whether rm i is inspected
but also depends on whether any rm with which rm i has a link is also inspected.6 Thus,
a rm i will not be detected if i is not inspected and any rm j that has an agreement with
i is not inspected. That is,
Pr (No Detected i) = Pr
0BB@No inspected i \
j 6=i
gij=1
No inspected j
1CCA
or equivalently,7
Pr (No Detected i) = (1  )N ni+1 (3)
Therefore, from a rms point of view, the probability of not being detected is endogenous
and depends on how many agreements rm i has signed, i.e., mi = N  ni. Note that, as the
number of agreements mi = N   ni increases, Pr (No Detected i) ! 0. On the other hand,
as mi = N   ni goes to 0, Pr (No Detected i)! (1  ).8
From the ATs point of view, the structure of relationships, described by mi = N   ni,
generates scale economies on detection since
Pr ( Detected i) = 1  (1  )N ni+1 > Pr ( Inspected i) = 
5See Section 5 for a detail discussion.
6We only consider the immediate link.
7 It is assumed that events "no inspection i" and "no inspection j" are independent each other.
8Observe that the Pr ( Detected i) = 1   Pr (No Detected i) is increasing and concave in the number of
agreements signed. That is, as mi = N   ni increases, the probability of being detected increases. However,
it increases at a decreasing rate.
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2.3 Incentives to form an agreement
An essential part of the model is the rms incentive to form an agreement. Assume that,
rm i has formed mi = N   ni agreements, but does not yet form an agreement with a rm
j, i.e., gij = 0. Then, by using expressions (1) and (3), we compute rm iexpected prots
as:
(1  )N ni+1i +

1  (1  )N ni+1
 
i   F () (4)
where i =  (ni) +  (nj) +
X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk), and F () = i.
Now, if rm i decides to form a link with rm j, its expected prots will be
(1  )N ni+2i +

1  (1  )N ni+2
 
i   F () (5)
but now, i =  (ni   1) +
X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk).
By subtracting (4) from (5), we obtain rm is incentive to form an agreement with rm
j as:
 = (1  )N ni+1
24 (ni   1)   (ni)   (nj)  
0@ (ni   1) + X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
1A35
(6)
Let J ij (ni; nj ; nk;) denote the bracket expression in (6). Then, it can be rewritten as:
 = (1  )N ni+1 J ij (ni; nj ; nk;)
It is worth noting that when the antitrust authority exists, rm is incentive to form a
market-sharing agreement with rm j depends not only on characteristics of markets i and
j but also on characteristics of market k and on the probability of inspection .9
We are interested in the sign of  because it is what is relevant to decide whether or
not one more link is formed. That is, if   0, rm i has an incentive to form an agreement
with j.
9We just consider the case when mi = N  ni 6= 0. However, when rm i is isolated, i.e. mi = N  ni = 0,
the rm is incentive to form an agreement is slightly di¤erent from (6). That is,  =  (N   1) (1  )2  
 (N)   (nj) 
X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
 
1  (1  )2.
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Therefore, when  6= 1,   0 only if J ij (ni; nj ; nk;)  0. Hence, in the following, we
will focus only on J ij (ni; nj ; nk;).
Thus, forming one more link has several conicting consequences. From rm is point of
view, notice that when a new link is formed, rm i agrees not to enter market j, hence rm i
loses access to foreign market j and it decreases its prots by   (nj). Given the reciprocal
nature of this agreement, rm j does not enter market i either. Therefore, the number
of active rms in market i will decrease and it increases its prots by  (ni   1)    (ni).
However, if rm i is detected on this new agreement, and it is inspected with probability ,
rm i will lose  (ni   1) +
X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk).
Note that, as  () is a decreasing function, when nj decreases, it decreases the incentive
to lose a more protable market by forming a link. Then, J ij is increasing in nj .
Likewise, J ij is increasing in nk. As nk gets smaller, the expected costs of signing an
agreement with j become greater.10 Hence, it decreases the incentive to form a collusive
agreement.
On the other hand, as  () is a convex function, J ij is decreasing in ni. As the number
of competitors in its home market decreases, (1  ) (ni   1)   (ni) increases.
Concerning the antitrust policy, when the probability of inspection  increases, J ij de-
creases, because it increases the expected cost of forming a link.
To sum up, the relationship between rms and the competition authority is the following.
Given the antitrust policy f; F ()g, rms compute the incentives to form agreements, and
then decide whether to form an agreement or not. Firms form them if they yield positive
net prots after expected penalties from signing market-sharing agreements. If an inquiry is
opened, and if a rm is convicted of forming a market-sharing agreement, it must pay F ().
2.4 Background denitions
In this part, we provide some denitions that will be useful in describing and analyzing the
model.
That is, we are considering rms that enter into bilateral relationships with each other,
i.e., market-sharing agreements are bilateral agreements; and the set of them gives rise to a
collusive network g.
Hence, we introduce some notations and terminology from graph theory to study that
collusive network.
10The expected cost is  
0@ X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
1A.
11
Networks Let N = f1; 2; :::; Ng, N  3 denote a nite set of identical rms.
For any i; j 2 N , the pairwise relationship or link between the two rms is captured by
a binary variable gij 2 f0; 1g, where gij = 1 means that there exists a link between rms i
and j. In other words, rms i and j serve a link.
A network g =
n
(gij)i;j2N
o
is a description of the pairwise relationship between rms.
Let g + gij denote the network obtained by adding link ij to an existing network g; and
denote by g   gij the network obtained by deleting link ij from an existing network g.
Some networks that play a prominent role in our analysis are the following two: the
complete network and the empty network.
The complete network, gc, is a network in which gij = 1;8i; j 2 N .
In contrast, the empty network, ge, is a network in which gij = 0;8i; j 2 N; i 6= j.
Formally, a rm is isolated if gij = 0;8j 6= i and 8i; j 2 N .
Paths and Components A path in a network g between rms i and j is a sequence of
rms i1; i2; :::; in such that gii1 = gi1i2 = gi2i3 = ::: = ginj = 1. We will say that a network is
connected if there exists a path between any pair i; j 2 N .
A component of a network g, is a nonempty subnetwork g0  g, such that: (1) if i 2 g0
and j 2 g0 where i 6= j, then there exists a path in g0 between i and j. And, (2) if i 2 g0 and
i; j 2 g then i; j 2 g0. Thus, a component of a network g is a maximally connected subset of
g: Note that from this denition, an isolated rm is not considered a component.
Let mi (g0) denote the number of links that rm i has in g0.
A component g0  g is complete if gij = 1 for all i; j 2 g0. For a complete component g0,
mi (g
0) + 1 denote its size, i.e., it is the number of rms belonging to g0.
The next gure represents a network with two complete components and an isolated rm.
·
Figure 1: Two complete components of size 3 and 2 and one isolated rm.
Stable collusive networks Our interest is to study which networks are likely to arise.
Hence, we need to dene a notion of stability. In the present paper, we always use a notion
of pairwise stability.
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Pairwise stable networks The following approach was taken by Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996). A network g is pairwise stable if and only if: (i) 8i; j 2 N such that gij = 1;
i (g)  i (g   gij) and j (g)  j (g   gij); and (ii) 8i; j 2 N such that gij = 0; if
i (g + gij) > 
i (g) then j (g + gij) < j (g).
In terms of our model, a network g is said to be pairwise stable if and only if:
(i) 8i; j s:t: gij = 1,
(
J ij (ni + 1; nj + 1; nk;)  0
J ji (nj + 1; ni + 1; nk;)  0
(ii) 8i; j s:t: gij = 0,
(
if J ij (ni; nj ; nk;) > 0
then J ji (nj ; ni; nk;) < 0
It is worth noting that the rst part of the denition requires that no rm would want to
delete a link that it serves. In other words, any rm has the discretion to unilaterally delete
the link. This contrasts with the second part of the denition. It means that the consent of
both is necessary to form a link. That is, forming a link is a bilateral decision.
The above stability notion is a relatively weak criterion in the sense that it provides
broad predictions and the rms deviations are constrained. A pairwise stability criterion
only considers deviations on a single link at a time.11 Furthermore, the pairwise stability
notion considers only deviations by a pair of players at a time.12
Nevertheless, that criterion provides a test to eliminate the unstable networks and it
should be seen as a necessary, but not su¢ cient condition for a network to be stable.
Strongly pairwise stable networks In order to obtain a stronger stability concept
we allow deviations by coalitions of rms. We allow rms to delete some or all market-sharing
agreements that they have already formed.
We say that a network is pairwise strongly stable if it is immune to deviations by coalitions
of two rms.
As BB do, we consider the simultaneous linking game introduced by Myerson (1991).
Each rm i chooses the set si of rms with which it wants to form a link. Thus, gij = 1 if
and only if j 2 si and i 2 sj . Let g (s1; s2; :::; sn) denote the network formed when every i
chooses si..
A strategy prole fs1; s2; :::; sng is a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium of the game if
and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the game and there does not exist a pair of rms
i and j and strategies si and sj such that i

g

si; sj ; s

 ij

 i

g

si ; s

j ; s

 ij

and
j

g

si; sj ; :::; s

 ij

 j

g

si ; s

j ; :::; s

 ij

with a strict inequality for one of the two
11On the contrary, for example, it is possible that a rm would not benet from forming a single link but
would benet from forming several links simultaneously.
12 It could be that larger groups of player can coordinate their actions in order to all be better o¤.
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rms. A network g is strongly pairwise stable if and only if there exists a pairwise strong
Nash equilibrium of the game fs1; s2; :::; sng such that g = g (s1; s2; :::; sn).
It can be proved that any strongly pairwise stable network is pairwise stable.13
Thus, the strong stability notion can be thought of as su¢ cient condition for stability.
3 Stable collusive networks in the symmetric context
In this section, we will characterize pairwise stable and strongly pairwise stable networks
under the presence of the AT in a symmetric context. Let us recall that the pairwise stability
notion might be thought of as a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for stability, and the
strong pairwise stable criterion provides a su¢ cient requirement for a network to be stable
over time. Also, recall that any strong pairwise stable network is pairwise stable.
3.1 Pairwise stable collusive network
The following two lemmas provide the necessary conditions on pairwise stability.
Lemma 1 Under Property 1, if network g is stable, then 8i; j 2 N such that gij = 1,
ni (g) = nj (g).
In the following, we simply use ni (g) = ni. From the Lemma we conclude that two
rms are connected by a market-sharing agreement in a stable network if they have the
same number of competitors on their home markets. If not, the link is not served. That is,
if ni 6= nj , the rm in the less protable market (with larger number of competitors in its
home market) does not have incentive to lose access to a more protable one (with a smaller
number of competitors) by signing a market-sharing agreement.
A straightforward implication of this is that an isolated rm, with N competitors in its
home market, refuses to form a link with any rm j such that nj < N . That is, if nj < N ,
under Property 1, then  (N   1)   (nj). Therefore, from J ijs expression, it will be also
true that
(1  ) (N   1) <  (N) +  (nj) + 
24 X
k:gik=0
 (nk)
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Lemma 2 Under Property 1 and 3, if network g is stable, then any component g0 of g is
complete. Moreover, these complete components have di¤erent sizes.
Then, by Lemma 2, a pairwise stable network can be decomposed into complete alliances
of di¤erent sizes. Then, if a set of rms is linked, all of them must be linked by a market-
13See Belleamme and Bloch (2004).
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sharing agreement among themselves, i.e., complete components.14 Moreover, if a pairwise
stable network has more than one component, they have di¤erent sizes. As BB already
establish, the intuition underlying this result is due to free riding. If a rm i has signed
more agreements than other rms, market i is a very protable one. Therefore, the other
rms will not want form a link with rm i because they do not want to lose access to a
protable market. In other words, the other rms free ride on the agreements signed by rm
i. By extending this argument, we say that rms in smaller alliances (with larger number
of competitors in their home markets) free ride on the agreements signed by rms in larger
ones (with smaller number of competitors) as any rm belonging to a small alliance has no
incentive to form an agreement with a rm that belongs to a large one.
Now, let us observe that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are stated only by using Property 1
and 3. Hence, in the absence or under the presence of the AT, both lemmas are always
true. Additionally, let us note that Lemma 1 and 2 talk about linked rms and how they
are linked. Then, in that context, two questions become relevant. Does the AT have any
impact on the size of the linked rmsalliances? Does the AT have any impact on the set of
rms that remain without links? The answer to them is interconnected. In our setting, the
competition authority a¤ects the net expected prots from entering into a market-sharing
agreement, and in turn impacts on the decision whether or not a link is formed. Thus,
gij = 1 only if
(1  ) (n  1)  2 (n) + 
X
k 6=j;ghk=0
 (nk) ; for k 6= h = i; j (7)
Let us see the impact of the AT on the decision to participate in a collusive agreement.
In the absence of the AT, i.e.,  = 0,15 the above inequality becomes  (n  1) > 2 (n).
Therefore, by log-convexity, it is possible to guarantee the existence of a number n = N m
such that  (n   1)  2 (n). Thus, m = N   n is interpreted as the minimal number of
agreements that a rm already has to have in order to form an additional one. In the absence
of a competition authority, there exists a lower bound on the size of collusive alliances, which
does not depend on g. Moreover, when m = 1, the number of isolated rms is at most 1.
14 In other words, J ij > 0 is increasing in the number of agreements already signed by rm i. To see this,
let us consider rms i, j and l. By now, let us focus only on rm i (the same explanation applies to rms
j and l). When rms i; j and l are linked in some way, and J ij > 0, then it will be also true that J
i
l > 0.
That is, J ij > 0 means that (1  ) (ni   1)  (ni) >  (nj)+
0@ (nl) + X
k 6=j;k 6=l;gki=0
 (nk)
1A. Therefore,
under the prot functionsproperties, it will be true that J il > 0. That is, (1  ) (ni   2)    (ni   1) >
 (nl) + 
X
k 6=j;k 6=l;gki=0
 (nk).
15 It is the Belleamme and Blochs setting.
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In contrast, under the presence of the AT, i.e.,  6= 0, we are not able to reach an unique
lower bound. From (7) we can see that the maximal number of competitors that assures
that the condition holds depends on each  and on each network g. Moreover, we will see
that if in a stable network the alliance of minimum size is equal to 1, it does not impose
any restriction on the set of isolated rm. The consequences of that over competition will
be discussed further in Section 4.
Consider the following network g that can be decomposed into distinct complete compo-
nents, g1,...,gL, of di¤erent sizes, i.e., m (gl) 6= m (gl0), 8l; l0.
Let us dene m (gh) := min fm (g1) ; :::;m (gL)g. That is, gh is the smallest component
of network g, whose size is m (gh) + 1.
The next lemma shows a su¢ cient condition on pairwise stability in our collusive context.
Lemma 3 Given a network g that can be decomposed into a set of isolated rms and di¤erent
complete components, g1,...,gL, of di¤erent sizes m (gl) 6= m (gl0), 8l; l0, if rm i 2 gh does
not have incentives to cut a link with a rm inside its alliance, then any j 2 gl will not have
incentives to cut a link with a player inside its component for all gl 6= gh.
The lemma provides a condition to check whether a rm has incentives to renege on one
agreement. Then, given a network g, it is su¢ cient to verify what happen inside the smallest
component. The intuition is as follows. A rm that belongs to the smallest component
has two disadvantages: (i) it has a larger number of competitors in its home market than
any rm that belongs to a greater alliance, and (ii) if the antitrust authority detects its
agreements, it loses prots on markets where it does not collude,16 and they are larger than
the same kind of prots of a rm that belongs to a larger cartel.17 Therefore, if any rm
i 2 gh has no incentive to renege on one agreement, no other linked rm will have it.
By combining the previous Lemmas, we state the following.
Proposition 1 A network g is stable if and only if it can be decomposed into a set of isolated
rms and distinct complete components, g1,...,gL of di¤erent sizes m (gl) 6= m (gl0), 8l; l0 such
that neither an isolated rm has an incentive to form a link with another isolated one nor
a rm i that belongs to the smallest component has an incentive to cut a link with a rm
inside it.
The above Proposition provides the characterization of the pairwise stable networks in the
symmetric context when the AT exists. Note that the Proposition holds for all m (gh)  1.
16That is,
X
k;gki=0
 (nk).
17Assume for simplicity that there are only two complete alliances, and i 2 gl and j 2 gl0 , where m (gl) <
m (gl0). Then,
X
k;gki=0
 (nk) = [m (gl0) + 1] (nj) >
X
k;gkj=0
 (nk) = [m (gl) + 1] (ni).
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From that characterization, we can predict that collusive alliances are complete, and they
have di¤erent sizes. However, we know that from the BBs setting. Hence, the AT does not
change that prediction.
Nevertheless, the AT imposes a change in the minimal size of the components and it
does not restrict the set of isolated rms. In the absence of the AT, i.e., the BBs setting,
a network is stable if its alliances are large enough. That is, the complete components have
to reach a minimal size, i.e., m. Moreover, if m = 1, there is, at most, one isolated rm.
However, under the presence of the AT, that threshold, i.e., m (gh), depends on each g
and on each .
By rewriting (7), we obtain the following:
 (n  1)
 (n)
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:ghk=0
 (nk)
(1  ) (n)  2; for k 6= h = i; j (8)
Therefore, and in spite of the fact that m (gh) depends on particular conditions, it is easy
to see that m (gh)  m. Nevertheless, in Section 4, we will show that this is not necessarily
a perverse e¤ect of the AT because m (gh)  1 does not put any restriction on the set of
isolated rm.
3.2 Pairwise strongly stable collusive network
We rene the set of stable networks by using the strong stability condition. Let us recall that
the di¤erence between stability and strong stability arises from the rmsability to delete
more than one link at once.
Then, we now allow rms to delete a subset of links already formed and we will study
when a rm has no incentive to renege on its agreements. This point is very important in
our context because a network composed by large alliances will be hard to sustain.
Proposition 2 A network g is pairwise strongly stable if and only if it is pairwise stable
and no rm prefers to cut all its agreements at once, that is
(1  )N n+1  (n)   (N)+(N   n) (n+ 1)+
X
k;gi=0
 (nk)

1  (1  )N n+1

; 8n = N m+1
(9)
Accordingly, the fact that a rm has no incentives to renege on all its links at once is a
su¢ cient condition for strong stability. To see this, assume that a rm reneges on one of its
agreements. Then, it gains access to a market whose prots are at least equal to the prot it
makes on its home market after cutting a link. Therefore, if a rm has incentive to cut one
agreement, the most protable deviation for it is to renege on all its agreements at once.
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Thus, in a strongly stable network, component sizes satisfy a more demanding condition.
It is worth remarking that a strongly stable network may fail to exist. Notwithstanding,
one important advantage of the strong criterion is to provide a more accurate prediction of
which network structures will prevail
3.3 Examples
Example 1 Pairwise Stable Network for  = 0 and  6= 0. Cournot competition with
exponential inverse demand function P (Q) = e Q
When inverse demand function is P (Q) = e Q, we can compute the equilibrium prots
as  (n) = e n.
In the absence of the AT, i.e.,  = 0, the pairwise stability condition (8) becomes
 (n  1)
 (n)
= e  2;8n
Hence, any two rms have incentives to form a link. Therefore, m = 1 and any network
with complete components of di¤erent sizes with at most one isolated rm is pairwise stable.
In contrast, when AT exists, i.e.,  6= 0 that is no longer true. Assume, for example,
N = 7 and  = 0:025. In such a context, the following is one network conguration that
belongs to the set of the pairwise stable networks:
·
·
Figure 2: Stable network, N = 7 and  = 0:025.
Let us observe that in this case m (gh) = 1, and the number of isolated rms in that
stable network is greater than 1. This result is in sharp contrast to the prediction established
in the absence of the AT.
We can easily check the su¢ cient conditions for pairwise stability: (i) no rm in the
smallest component wants to cut a link that it serves because it is protable to maintain it.
That is, (8) holds (the Appendix contains all calculations); (ii) for any isolated rm, it is
true that (6)(7) <
2
(1 ) +
(3(5)+2(6))
(1 )(7) .
Example 2 Pairwise Stable Network and Strongly Stable Network for  = 0 and  6= 0.
Cournot competition with exponential inverse demand function P (Q) = e Q
As stated above, in this competition context,  (n) = e n.
Now, assume N = 5. The following table depicts the set of pairwise stable (ps) and
pairwise strongly stable (pss) networks for  = 0 and for  = 0:04. First of all, it is useful
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to clarify some notations there. In the table, the complete network is represented by f5g
and, for example, f3; 1; 1g denotes a network decomposed into two isolated rms and one
complete component of size three.
Table 1
 Set of ps networks Set of pss networks
 = 0 f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f3; 2g
 = 0:04 f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g It fails to exist
When  = 0, any two rm have an incentive to form a market-sharing agreement, as
(n 1)
(n) = e  2;8n. In other words, for  = 0, m = 1.
By applying the strong stability condition, we obtain that only components of size 3 and
2 are strongly stable.
Let us note, from Table 1, that the strong criterion selects a subset of stable networks,
and it allows us to improve our prediction about which networks prevail over time.
Now, let us observe that, for  = 0:04, m (gl ) = 2 > m
 = 1. In spite of this fact, it is
easy to see that the network f3; 1; 1g entails more competition than f3; 2g.
Additionally, this example illustrates that, in some circumstances, the strongly stable
network fails to exist, and every network is defeated by some other network which only leads
to cycles.
4 The Antitrust Authority and the set of stable collusive net-
works
In our setting, the presence of the antitrust authority f; F ()g introduces a negative ex-
ternality to each formed link, and as a result, the expected gain of being a part of a collusive
agreement may not be positive.18 That is, the expected sanction imposed by the AT af-
fects the incentive participation constraint of each potential alliances member, and in turn
changes the set of possible network structures that can arise.
Given the network characterization of the previous section, we now analyze which kind
of stable networks can be sustained at di¤erent levels of the antitrust enforcement.
4.1 The set of pairwise stable networks
First of all, a complete network is always pairwise stable for su¢ ciently low s. Let us
dene c := 1  2(2)(1) .
18 It is, J ij :=  (ni   1)   (ni)   (nj)  
0@ (ni   1) + X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
1A ;8i; j.
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Proposition 3 The complete network gc is pairwise stable if and only if   c.
Being a part of a collusive agreement entails positive benets. To serve a link increases the
prots of rms that participate in it (i.e.,  (n) is decreasing in n). Therefore, the complete
network will be always pairwise stable as long as its costs (i.e., the expected sanction) are
su¢ ciently low.
Second, the empty network arises as pairwise stable for su¢ ciently high s. Let us dene
e (N) := 1 
h
N(N)
[(N 1)+(N 2)(N)]
i 1
2
, for 8N 2 [3;1).
Proposition 4 For 8N 2 [3;1), the empty network ge is pairwise stable if and only if
 > e (N).
For an isolated rm, e (N) is the threshold from which it has no incentive to participate
in an agreement when all other rms also remain isolated. When  > e (N), the expected
costs to form a link are so high, relative to its benets, that no two rms will sign an
agreement.
Moreover, observe that e (N) is strictly decreasing in N . That is, as N increases, the
"loot" becomes less "attractive" (i.e.,  (N) is decreasing in N), and therefore the threshold
will get smaller.
By straightforward computations, we can see that e (N) < c. Consequently, from the
above Propositions, we claim the following:
Claim 1 For  2 (e (N) ; c], ge and gc belong to the set of pairwise stable networks.
From Proposition 3 and 4 and Claim 1, we can state that pairwise stable networks always
exist. That is, rst, for   c, the complete network belongs to the set of stable networks.
Second, for  > e (N), the empty network will be stable. And given that e (N) < c, then
ge and gc arise as pairwise stable congurations.
Third, let us recall that J ij is an increasing function in nk and in turn implies that free
riding on the market-sharing agreements made by the other rms is no longer "so free".
In other words,  6= 0 means that there exists a positive probability of being caught in a
market-sharing agreement. Consequently, there exists a positive probability of losing prots
not only in the market where the agreement is signed but also in markets in which the rm
is active, i.e. in markets where the rm does not collude.
For rms in smaller alliances the cost of forming a link becomes signicant, relative to
their benets. That is, a rm i inside a small alliance does not have much to gain and
has a lot to lose when one more link is made: (i) it gains (1  ) (ni   1)    (ni) that
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gets smaller as the alliance is smaller because the number of active rms is greater in small
components; and (ii) it loses not only the access to prots on foreign market j,  (nj), but
it also loses, in expected terms, 
P
k:gik=0
 (nk).
Therefore, rms in smaller components are more sensitive to the antitrust enforcement.
The intuition provided above is summarized in the next Proposition.
Before introducing it, let us dene
 (ni) :=
 (ni   1)  2 (ni)
 (ni   1) +
X
k 6=j;gi=0
 (nk)
Proposition 5 If n1 > n2, then  (n1) <  (n2).
That is, at  (ni) a rm i, with ni competitors in its home market, is indi¤erent to form
a link or not (i.e.,J ij = 0). Therefore, when  > 
 (ni), then J ij < 0, and rms i and j do
not sign a collusive agreement.
From the Proposition follows that the threshold is smaller for rms in smaller alliances
(with larger number of competitors in their home markets). Then, as  becomes greater,
the AT rstly tears down small alliances, i.e., the smaller components are more sensitive to
the antitrust policy. In the limit, rms must decide to form a very large alliance (complete
network) or no alliance at all (empty network).
Proposition 6 For  = c, the only pairwise stable networks are ge and gc.
Then, by setting  > c, the AT completely deters the formation of collusive agreements.
4.2 The set of pairwise strongly stable networks
Now, we turn our attention to strongly stable notion and we answer which kinds of networks
arise as the AT changes its enforcement level. From the previous section, we know that
there will be some pairwise stable networks that will not be stable against changes in the
agreements made by rms. By applying (9), we assert the following:
Proposition 7 As  becomes greater, rms in large components have more incentives to
delete all links at once.
That is, as  increases, the strongly stable condition is harder to sustain in larger compo-
nents. In other words, faced with increasing , a rm has to consider whether to maintain or
to destroy its agreements. Therefore, the rm balances the pros and the cons of any decision.
Namely, if a rmmaintains its agreements, its benets are (1  )N n+1
24 (n) + X
k;gi=0
 (nk)
35.
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Let us note that these benets decrease as the probability of inspection () increases,
and the fall in the expected benets is higher as m = N   n is higher.
Instead, if the rm decides to destroy all its agreements, it is not only not penalized now
by the AT, but also it will gain access to markets where it was colluding before. In such a
situation, it will make prots on all these new foreign markets, i.e., (N   n) (n+ 1). Let
us observe that these markets are more protable as the number of competitors on them is
smaller, i.e., as m = N   n is larger.
Therefore, rms belonging to larger alliances have more incentives to cut all its agree-
ments at once as the AT increases the cost of forming links.
Now, let us consider the empty network under the strongly stable notion.
It is worth noting that if ge is pairwise stable, it is also strongly pairwise stable, as
the condition (9) is always satised for rms that remaining alone. That is, in an empty
network, rms do not have any link, so the condition of not having incentives to renege on
all agreements at once, is redundant for any i 2 ge. Hence, we claims that
Claim 2 8 > e (N) the empty network is always strongly pairwise stable.
Accordingly, if for some  > e (N) all alliances have been torn down by the antitrust
policy, the only network conguration that exists is the empty one.
4.3 Examples
The following examples illustrate the changes that the AT imposes in the set of pairwise
stable networks. (The Appendix contains all calculations.)
Example 3 Pairwise stable (ps) networks. Cournot competition with exponential inverse
demand function P (Q) = e Q
Let us recall that in this context  (n) = e n.
Assume that N = 5. The following table depicts the set of pairwise stable networks for
di¤erent values of the antitrust policy.
Table 2
 Set of ps networks
 2 [0; 0:015) f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g
 2 [0:015; 0:04) f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g
 2 [0:04; 0:065) f2; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g
 2 [0:065; 0:21) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g
 2 [0:21; 0:25) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g
 2 [0:25; 0:26) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f5g
 > 0:26 f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
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Thus, when  is su¢ ciently low (i.e.,  < 0:015) the presence of the AT does not change
the set of pairwise stable networks. However, when the antitrust enforcement is su¢ ciently
high (i.e.,  > 0:26) the only pairwise stable network is the empty one, and hence all rms
are active in all markets.
Consider now values for s between these two extreme cases. Although di¤erent con-
gurations arise, the main features to be highlighted are the following two. First, when 
increases, more structures that are competitive can be sustained through bilateral agree-
ments. In particular, when  becomes greater, the smaller components are more sensitive to
the antitrust policy. For example, when  2 [0:015; 0:04) the network structure f3; 2g is no
longer stable because rms in smaller components have incentives to cut their agreements
and the network f3; 1; 1g becomes stable. Likewise, it is noteworthy that graphs like f3; 1; 1g
or f2; 1; 1; 1g are not pairwise stable when  = 0, i.e., BBs setting. Second, as  increases
the set of stable network congurations becomes more polarized. That is, in our analytical
example, when  2 (0:25; 0:26) the empty or complete networks are the only possible stable
network congurations. This can be understood because the AT imposes costs of forming
links and it reduces the protability of each one. Hence, rms decide either to form more
and more links, i.e. reduce the number of competitors in their home markets, in order to
balance their benets with their cost, or not forming a link at all and by doing that they
avoid the costs levied by the AT.
Now, the next example illustrates both the special features of the strong criterion and
the impact of the AT on the set of strongly stable networks.
Example 4 Pairwise strongly stable (pss) networks. Cournot competition for exponential
inverse demand function: P (Q) = e Q
As in the last example, assume that N = 5. Given that a pairwise strongly stable network
is always pairwise stable, it su¢ ces to check condition (9) for all network structures in Table
2 at di¤erent levels of the antitrust policy.
Table 3
 Set of ps networks Set of pss networks
 2 [0; 0:015) f3; 2g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f3; 2g
 2 [0:015; 0:04) f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g it fails to exist
 2 [0:04; 0:065) f2; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f2; 1; 1; 1g
 2 [0:065; 0:21) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f3; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
 2 [0:21; 0:25) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f4; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
 2 [0:25; 0:26) f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g ; f5g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
 > 0:26 f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g f1; 1; 1; 1; 1g
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First, the example claries that the possible set of stable networks is reduced by using
the strongly stable criterion. However, the strongly stable network might fail to exist and
this is what happens for  2 [0:015; 0:04).
Second, the incentive to free ride and delete all links is higher in larger alliances. That
is, when a rm that belongs to a large alliance cuts all its agreements at once, it will recover
access to more protable markets than a rm belonging to a small component. In the
example, the complete network f5g and the stable network f4; 1g do not pass the strongly
stable condition. By extending this argument, the empty network is the only strongly stable
network for  > 0:065.
Therefore, antitrust policy is on the side of competition as long as it gives rms in large
alliances more incentives to renege on their agreements at once.
4.4 The AT and its e¤ects on competition
From the previous analysis, we conclude that, as  increases the smaller alliances are rst
in being destroyed by the antitrust policy. In turn, the set of isolated rms expands.
Moreover, as  becomes larger, m (gh) also increases. However, from Proposition 7, we
know that large alliances are harder to sustain.
Therefore, as  increases, the empty network, ge, tends to emerge as the only pairwise
strongly stable network. Let us recall that in an empty network, all rms are active in all
markets. Then, we infer that the antitrust policy is a pro-competitive one.
As it is well known, in Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous goods, the social surplus
(V ) is increasing in the number of active rms on the market.
From Proposition 6, when  > c, the ge is the only network that prevails over time.
Therefore, in such a case, V would be the maximum.
Although  > c may be the "advice" to give to the AT, it may not be the optimal
antitrust policy, because the necessary costs to attain that enforcement level may outweigh
its positive impact on the social surplus. That is, in order to know whether the AT has a
net positive e¤ect on social welfare, we must also consider the cost of enforcement.
Thus, the net social welfare, W , depends on the network structure g (which depends,
at last, on the particular level of ), as well as, on the cost of initiating a market-sharing
agreement suit against a rm (C).
Hence, if the AT were concerned about the optimal antitrust policy, then it would have
to choose  such that maximizes
W (g () ; C) = V (g ())  C
Unfortunately, in our network context, g () is not unique for each . Moreover, a partic-
ular network g can emerge as pairwise stable for di¤erent levels of . Therefore the optimal
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antitrust policy is di¢ cult to evaluate due to the multiplicity on network congurations for
each level of antitrust enforcement.
5 The AT and collusive networks: a discussion
The collusive network in market-sharing agreements interacts with the antitrust policy de-
ned by f; F ()g.
As we have seen, in the network context, an agreement, i.e., a link, creates both positive
and negative externalities. As the number of competitors in the home market is reduced by
a market-sharing agreement, the "booty" of collusive rms increases ( (n) is a decreasing
function in n).
In contrast, each link entails negative e¤ects imposed by the AT. One more link increases
the probability of being discovered, which is higher than the probability of being inspected
(). Furthermore, the ne imposed by AT depends on the links held by each rm. That is,
it is equal to the total prot that each guilty rm i ends up having, and it depends on the ni
and nk (see expression (6)). Thus, the penalty ultimately depends on the network structure
as a whole.
Our setting is a simpler one, because the aim is focused on the study of formed collusive
networks once the antitrust policy is set. At this point, at least two di¤erent issues emerge
in the discussion.
One of them is where antitrust policy dened in this article f; F ()g is in the theory
and in the practices of the antitrust enforcement.
The second issue is related to the optimal antitrust enforcement. We will briey discuss,
under our network context, whether and how we can move the analysis to consider other
enforcement policies in searching of the optimal ones.
5.1 Theory and practices of the antitrust enforcement
The struggle against collusive agreements has two elementary tools: (i) the penalty that is
imposed to o¤enders, and (ii) the probability of inspection. Both them are instruments that
antitrust authorities use to deter collusion.
Modeling the nes
From the theoretical perspective. In the economic literature of optimal enforcement, nes are
usually assumed as socially costless. Therefore, when the AT seeks to deter collusion, the
nes should be set at the maximum level in order to minimize the inspection cost.19 An
implication of this is that the nes need not to be related to the illegal prots or to the harm
19This holds when rms are risk-neutral.
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that the o¤enders caused. They only need to be as high as it is possible in order to deter
collusion. This implication holds as long as there are not legal errors in the detection process
(false convictions), or as long as the nes do not imply bankruptcy to convicted rms.
In the theoretical literature of antitrust policy, some articles set the ne as high as
possible. For example, Besanko and Spulber (1989), by assuming a risk neutral cartel, make
the ne equal to the rms limited liability. However, other articles, avoiding any problem,
assume the penalties as exogenous parameters and set by the law.20
Additionally, other papers consider di¤erent regimes of punishment. For example, in
Harrington (2004 and 2005), the penalty for a guilty rm is equal to the sum of the rms
damages (i.e., any penalty that is sensitive to the prices charged) and a xed ne (i.e., xed
with respect to the endogenous variables). Additionally, he assumes the penalty is su¢ ciently
bounded from above in order to avoid the rms bankruptcy.
Likewise, Souam (2001) studies the optimality between two regimes of penalty that are
often used in practice. One of them involves a ne based on revenues and the other one is
related to the damage caused to consumers by illegal practices.
From the practical perspective. The theoretical perspective sometimes contrasts with what
we nd in the actual antitrust policies. For example, both in the EU and in the US, the
current laws (i) set a ceiling for the maximum ne, and (ii) try to relate the penalty to the
cartels consequences. The underlying reasons behind these two features are the concern
about (i) the rmsability to pay, and (ii) the presence of legal errors.
That is, if the nes are too high, they may risk the rms ability to continue competing
in the future. This is the reason for which antitrust authorities establish a maximum on
nes.
On the other hand, legal errors may deter some socially desirable behavior, like some
forms of legal cooperation between rms, which may be misjudged as collusive. In this case,
the ne must be related to the harm caused or the gains produced by the cartels members.
Thus, for example, in European laws, according to Art.23 and 24 of Regulation No1/200321
the penalty is a percentage of the collusive rms turnover. Moreover, Art. 23(3) establishes
that "in xing the amount of the ne, regard shall be had both to the gravity and to the
duration of the infringement".
Since, in the present article, we assume that the competition authority does not commit
legal errors and the framework is a static one (i.e. we do not care about bankruptcy), then
it seems reasonable to set the ne equal to the limited liability of rms, which in our model
is equal to the rms total prots.
20See, among others, Harrington (2003), Frezal (2006), Chen and Rey (2007) and Motta and Polo (2003).
21Council Regulation (EC) No1/2003, on implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty, articles 23-26.
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Modeling the inspection process
From the theoretical perspective. In modeling the inspection process, most papers assume
that antitrust authorities have constant and exogenous budgets that allow them to inspect
a x number of rms. However, competition authorities sometimes have endogenous audit
strategies, which determine when a particular rm is inspected.
Thus, for example, in a static setting, the probability of being caught has been studied as
an increasing function in the rms markup over its marginal cost,22 or a decreasing function
in the observed market quantity.23 In a dynamic setting, the probability of being discovered
is allowed to depend not only on the current price but also on the previous periods price.24
Here, it is worth mentioning that Kühn (2001) o¤ers a detailed discussion about the
problems in detecting cartels, beyond the lack of information on cost. He remarks that the
information on actual prices or quantities may be unavailable. Moreover, even in the ideal
case when the data is acquirable, they may be too sensitive to functional form specications.
In contrast, other articles consider the probability of inspection as a xed parameter. For
example, Chen and Rey (2007) and Motta and Polo (2003) study the optimal enforcement
policy in a leniency program context, and they assume the probability of being investigated
as exogenously xed.25
From the practical perspective. A constant and exogenous probability of inspection can
be interpreted as a surprise inspection policy, that although it may be e¤ective,26 it does
not exist in the current practices.
In the EU, for example, there is always initial evidence that motivates the European
Commission to investigate. Moreover, in fact, it is quite often provided by cartel members
in the leniency programs, internal whistle-blowers and complainants, such as customers or
competitors of the alleged cartel.
Moreover, in Europe, the legal basis for inspection27 species that they are not to be
random. According to Art.20(4) of Regulation No1/2003 the decision to inspect must specify
"the subject matter and purpose of the inspection, appoint the date on which (the inspection)
is to begin...".
In light of this evidence, a constant and exogenous probability of inspection sometimes is
used in the theoretical literature for the sake of simplicity. However, given legal restrictions,
22See Block et al. (1981).
23See, among others, Besanko and Spulber (1989), Polo (1997), and Souam (2001).
24See, for example, Harrington (2003), (2004) and (2005).
25However, Motta and Polo (2003) begin their analysis by considering the policy parameters as exogenous.
After that, they discuss the trade-o¤between the monitoring and prosecution rates, and determine the optimal
level of those parameters, which will nally depend on an exogenous budget.
26Friederiszick and Maier-Rigaud (2007) argue that "surprise inspections are by far the most e¤ective and
sometimes the only means of obtaining the necessary evidence...."
27Council Regulation (EC) No1/2003, on implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles
81 and 82 of the Treaty, articles 20-22.
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this policy is not used in practice, even though it may be more e¤ective than other inspection
policies.
5.2 Some extensions toward the optimal enforcement in the network con-
text
We could extend the analysis in, at least, two ways. First, in the actual practice, the initial
evidence that prompts competition authorities to adopt an inspection decision is supplied by
customers or competitors. Anomalous prices may cause customers or competitors to suspect
collusive behavior. Therefore, an enforcement policy described by a probability of inspection
positively related with prices seems to be interesting and realistic.
That is, given the collusive network framework, more links will imply higher prices, and
therefore a greater probability of inspection. Then, when a particular rm is calculating
the probability of being caught, it takes into account who will be its partner in a collusive
agreement. That is, the rm in consideration cares about not only how many links it has
but also how many agreements its partner has. This asymmetry between rms may cause
the network conguration to change.
The second extension is related to a more complex antitrust policy, e.g. a leniency pro-
gram. In this situation, the current assumption about the competition authoritys technology
should be changed. Here, we are assuming that when the AT audits, it detects the rms
involved in a market-sharing agreement without errors (and without cost). If we relax this
assumption, then we allow the evidence which is reported by rms, in a leniency program, to
have some value for the AT. Moreover, we must change the static setting toward a dynamic
one, and therefore consider the network formation game.
5.3 Other extensions
Stable Collusive Networks in the Asymmetric Context
We extend the analysis to asymmetric situations, particularly, by assuming asymmetric
markets. By proceeding in this way, we are nearer to realistic situations but farther from
providing a generalization of the results. For that reason, we use an example where three
rms operate in markets with di¤erent protability.
Example 5 The AT and Asymmetric Markets
Consider the inverse demand function Pi (Q) = Aie Q and assume A3 > A2 > A1 = 1.
The set of congurations of stable networks is the same for all   0. The presence of the
AT implies more competition, though the network conguration remains unchanged. That
is,
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1. The complete network is stable if A3  e (1  )   1. And it is strong stable if
A3  (e
2(1 )3 1)
e  A2:
2. The empty network is stable when (i) A2 > (e  1)    (e+A3) and (ii) A3 >
A2 (e  1)   (A2 + 1)
3. The three networks with two linked rms and one isolated rm are stable for di¤erent
combinations of the parameter. For instance, the network with a single agreement
between the rms in the larger markets is stable if and only if A3  A2 (e  1)  
 (A2e  1) :
4. An incomplete collusive network is stable, for instance, the smallest market forms
an agreement with each of the other two rms, when (i) A2 (e  1)   A2 < A3 
e (e  1)   e2 and (ii) A2  e+A3e(1 )2 1 . Additionally, it is strongly stable if and only
if A3 +A2 
 
e2   1+ e2  3  2   3
5. Fails to exist if (i) A2 < (e  1)    (e+A3); (ii) A3 < A2 (e  1)    (A2 + 1); and
A3  e (e  1)  e2.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have characterized the stable collusive network that arises when rms form market-
sharing agreements among themselves, in a symmetric oligopolistic setting when an antitrust
authority exists.
In this network framework, the incentives to participate in a collusive agreement are
weakened by the AT, because it reduces the net expected benet from signing them. Under
the presence of the AT, the expected penalties of forming illegal links appear, and they
are positively related with the network conguration. This is because of two facts. First,
rms, considering whether to sign an agreement, take into account the probability of being
discovered rather than the probability of being inspected; and the rst probability positively
depends on the number of agreements each rm has signed. Second, the ne imposed by the
AT on a guilty rm is equal to its total prots, which depends on the number of active rms
in its home market and also on the number of active rms in all foreign markets in which
the guilty rm does not collude. Consequently, the penalty will be greater as the number of
active rms in those market is smaller, i.e., the number of links is larger. Thus, the penalty
positively depends on the network conguration as a whole.
We have shown that, the pairwise stable network can be decomposed into a set of isolated
rms and complete components of di¤erent sizes. However, when the AT exists, we cannot
dene a unique lower bound on the size of complete components because, now, it depends on
each network conguration and on each probability of being inspected. In turn, this implies
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that, although the lower bound on the size of complete components may be greater, the set
of isolated rms enlarges and nally, more structures that are competitive can be sustained
through bilateral agreements.
We have also shown that, antitrust laws have a pro-competitive e¤ect as they give rms
in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once. Therefore the empty
network might arise as the only strongly stable network.
The network congurations in the asymmetric context are the same as when the antitrust
authority does not exist; however, its presence reduces the space of protable collusion
because it imposes additional restrictions.
Although the optimal deterrence policy is beyond of the scope of the current paper, an
important policy implication of the current formulation is that the organization of the il-
legal behavior matters. That is, the analysis of the optimal deterrence of market-sharing
agreements has to take into account the organizational structure of collusive rms. Further-
more, without consideration of the e¤ects of the organizational structure, empirical studies
may overestimate the contribution of e¤orts devoted to investigate and prosecute collusive
agreements.28
In this paper, we consider a relatively simple setting for analyzing the e¤ect of the
antitrust policy f; F ()g on the structure of criminal behavior. Then, one can go from
here in many directions. One of them is to consider the probability of inspection as a function
of prices. This introduces some asymmetry among rms, and then the criminal networks
conguration may change. Another extension to this paper is to introduce a more complex
antitrust policy, e.g. a leniency program. In this way, we have to move towards a dynamic
setting where the study of the network formation game becomes relevant.
7 Appendix
Necessary conditions for pairwise stability
Proof Lemma 1 Since g is stable, when gij = 1 the next two conditions simultaneously
hold:
(1  ) (ni (g))   (ni (g) + 1) +  (nj (g) + 1) + 
X
k:gik=0
 (nk (g))
(1  ) (nj (g))   (nj (g) + 1) +  (ni (g) + 1) + 
X
k:gjk=0
 (nk (g))
28Some empiral papers that estimate the deterrent e¤ect of the policy are, among others, Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2005), Connor (2006), Zimmerman and Connor (2005).
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Given that the prot function is decreasing in n, the following are a pair of necessary
conditions that must be satised for the above inequalities to hold:
 (ni (g)) >  (nj (g) + 1)
 (nj (g)) >  (ni (g) + 1)
From the rst inequality ni (g) < nj (g) + 1 and from the second one nj (g) < ni (g) + 1
Hence:
nj (g)  1 < ni (g) < nj (g) + 1, ni (g) = nj (g)
That is
ni (g) = nj (g)  n (g)
Proof Lemma 2
Part 1: If g is stable then any component g0 2 g is complete. Suppose g0 is not
complete. Then, there are three rms i; j; l in the component such that gij = gjl = 1 and
gil = 0. Because g is stable, then by Lemma 1 ni (g) = nj (g)  n (g); also nj (g) = nl (g) 
n (g) ; then ni (g) = nj (g) = nl (g)  n (g). By stability, we rewrite J ij , J ji , and J lj as follow:
 (n)
 (n+ 1)| {z }
A
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:gik=0;i6=k
i (nk (g))
(1  ) (n+ 1)| {z }
B
for i 6= k
 (n)
 (n+ 1)
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:gjk=0;j 6=k
j (nk (g))
(1  ) (n+ 1) for j 6= k
 (n)
 (n+ 1)
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:glk=0;l 6=k
l (nk (g))
(1  ) (n+ 1) for l 6= k
Given that gil = 0, then one or both conditions hold:
 (n  1)
 (n)| {z }
D
<
2
(1  ) +

P
k:gik=0;i6=k
i (nk (g))
(1  ) (n)| {z }
E
for i 6= k; and/or
 (n  1)
 (n)
<
2
(1  ) +

P
k:glk=0;l 6=k
l (nk (g))
(1  ) (n) for l 6= k
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By log-convexity, we can establish that:
A  D
From stability:
B  A  D < E
However given that prots are decreasing functions and given that the number of terms
in
P
k:gik=0
i (nk) in B and E are di¤erent, we can say that:
B > E
This is a contradiction. Then g0 must be a complete component.
The same logic applies for l:
Part 2: If g is stable then the complete components must have di¤erent sizes.
Take two rms i; j in component g0 and a rm l in g00. Suppose, by contradiction, that
m(g0) + 1 = m(g00) + 1. Therefore, we have ni (g) = nj (g) = nl (g)  n. The stability of g
implies that J ij  0 and J ji  0. That is:
 (n)
 (n+ 1)| {z }
A
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:gik=0;i6=k
i (nk (g))
(1  ) (n+ 1)| {z }
B
for i 6= k
 (n)
 (n+ 1)
 2
(1  ) +

P
k:gjk=0;j 6=k
j (nk (g))
(1  ) (n+ 1) for j 6= k
For i and/or l, one or both conditions hold:
 (n  1)
 (n)| {z }
D
<
2
(1  ) +

P
k:gik=0; i 6=k
i (nk (g))
(1  ) (n)| {z }
E
for i 6= k; and/or
 (n  1)
 (n)
<
2
(1  ) +

P
k:glk=0;l 6=k
l (nk (g))
(1  ) (n) for l 6= k
By log-convexity, we can establish that:
A  D
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From stability conditions:
B  A  D < E
However, given that prots are decreasing functions and given that the number of terms
in
P
k:gik=0
i (nk) in B and E are di¤erent, we can say that:
B > E
Nevertheless, it is a contradiction with the assumption that prots are log-convex and
stability of g.
The same logic applies for l.
Proof Lemma 3 If i 2 gh does not have incentives to cut a link with a rm inside its
component, it is true that:
 (N  m (gh))

 
N  m  gh+ 1 > 2(1  ) +

"
(m (gl) + 1) (N  m (gl)) +
P
k:gik=0
 (nk)
#
(1  )  N  m  gh+ 1 (10)
Assume by contradiction that j 2 gl for m (gl) > m (gh) has an incentive to cut a link with
a rm inside its component. Then
 (N  m (gl))
 (N  m (gl) + 1) <
2
(1  ) +

"
(m (gh) + 1) (N  m (gh)) +
P
k:gjk=0
 (nk)
#
(1  ) (N  m (gl) + 1) (11)
When prots are decreasing in n, then RHS(10)>RHS(11). By log-convexity assumption
LHS(10)<LHS(11). Therefore, if i does not have an incentive to cut a link with a rm inside
its component, LHS(10)> RHS(10), then LHS(11)>RHS(11), which contradicts (11).
Proof Proposition 1 Lemmas 1 and 2 provide necessary conditions on stability. Let
us consider the su¢ cient part. Consider a network g that can be decomposed into a set of iso-
lated rms and distinct complete components, g1,...,gL of di¤erent sizesm (gl) 6= m (gl0),8l; l0.
Isolated players have no incentive to create a link with another isolated one. As long as a rm
i, that belongs to the smallest component, does not have incentives to cut a link with a rm
inside its component, then, by Lemma 3, no rm inside a component has incentives to cut
a link. Additionally, given that m (gl) 6= m (gl0),8l; l0, there do not exist two rms belonging
to di¤erent components that have an incentive to form an agreement between themselves.
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Proof Proposition 2 ) Consider a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium s. Given that
any strongly pairwise stable network is pairwise stable, g (s) can be decomposed into a set
of isolated rms and complete components where no isolated rm wants to form a link with
another isolated one and (10) holds . But assume, by contradiction, that some component
gl does not satisfy the condition (1  )m  (N  m+ 1)   (N)+(m  1) (N  m+ 2)+P
 (nk) (1  (1  )m) 8m = m (gl). Then s is not a Nash equilibrium because any rm i
in gl has a protable deviation by choosing s0i = ;.
(= Assume network g can be decomposed into a set of isolated rms and complete com-
ponents of di¤erent sizes, where inequality (10) holds. Also assume that (1  )m  (N  m+ 1) 
 (N) + (m  1) (N  m+ 2) +P (nk) (1  (1  )m) holds for all m = m (gl). We will
show that the following strategies form a pairwise strong Nash equilibrium. For rm i 2 gl
it announces si = fjjj 2 gl; j 6= ig, however, if i is isolated, it announces si = ;. Hence,
a) No isolated rm i has an incentive to create a link with another rm j, as i =2 sj .
b) As (1  )m  (N  m+ 1)   (N)+(m  1) (N  m+ 2)+P (nk) (1  (1  )m)
holds for all m = m (gl), the rm has no incentive to destroy all its m links. However, we
must consider the rms incentives to cut a subset of them. Let us assume it has an incentive
to delete a strict subset of its links, hence, it chooses to delete h links because
(1  )h  (N  m+ 1) <  (N  m+ 1 + h) + h (N  m+ 2) +
X
 (nk)

1  (1  )h

Given that h  1, then
 (N  m+ 1 + h) + h (N  m+ 2)  (h+ 1) (N  m+ 2)
Since we are considering a strict subset of links, then h < m  1 and h+ 1 < m  1, hence
(h+ 1) (N  m+ 2) < (m  1) (N  m+ 2)
Therefore
(1  )m  (N  m+ 1) < (1  )h  (N  m+ 1) < (m  1) (N  m+ 2)
that contradicts our hypothesis.
c) No rm i 2 gl has an incentive to create a link with rm j 2 gl0 as i =2 sj . Moreover,
as m (gl) 6= m (gl0) for all l 6= l0 , no pair of rms i 2 gl and j 2 gl0 has an incentive to create
a new link between them.
d) As (1  )m  (N  m+ 1)   (N)+(m  1) (N  m+ 2)+P (nk) (1  (1  )m)
holds for all m = m (gl), when m > 3; no pair of rms have incentives to delete all their
links nor a subsets of their agreements and to form a link between them. Let us assume, by
34
contradiction, a pair of rms, i 2 m and j 2 m0, has incentive to destroy all their m and m0
links each and form a link between them. For rm i, this is
(1  )m 2  (N  m+ 1)
<  (N   1) + (m  1) (N  m+ 2) +  m0   1  N  m0 + 2+
+
X
k 6=j 6=i;gik=0;
 (nk)  (1  )m 2
24 X
k 6=j 6=i;gik=0;
 (nk) +m
0
 
N  m0 + 1
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Given that, the LHS(12)>LHS(9) and by straightforward computations we can show
that RHS(9)>RHS(12), when condition(9) holds then LHS(12)>RHS(12), which contradicts
(12).
Calculation details of Example 1 For alliances of sizes 2, we must check stability
condition (8). That is, whether (6)(7) >
2
(1 ) +
(3(5)+2(7))
(1 )(7) holds,
e >
2
(1  ) +

 
3e 5 + 2e 7

(1  ) e 7 = 2: 671 0
Then (8) holds for any rm belonging to a smaller component.
From Lemma 3 and given the last inequality, we know that any rm inside the bigger
component does not want to cut a link. A rm in the bigger component has an incentive to
maintain a link as long as (5)(6) >
2
(1 ) +
(2(6)+2(7))
(1 )(6) . That is:
e >
2
(1  ) +
2
 
e 6 + e 7

(1  ) e 6 = 2: 121 4
And for isolated rms, it is true that (6)(7) <
2
(1 ) +
(3(5)+2(6))
(1 )(7) . That is:
e <
2
(1  ) +

 
3e 5 + 2e 6

(1  ) e 7 = 2: 759 1
Proof Proposition 3 (=)) If gc is pairwise stable then
(1  ) (1)  2 (2) (13)
By rewriting the last condition, we get   c = 1  2(2)(1) .
((=) If   c = 1   2(2)(1) , then (1  ) (1)  2 (2). Therefore, gc will be pairwise
stable.
Proof Proposition 4 Assume that N  3.
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(=)) If ge is pairwise stable then,
(1  )2 [ (N   1) + (N   2) (N)] <  (N) +  (N) + (N   2) (N) (14)
and, by straightforward calculation,
 > 1 

N (N)
[ (N   1) + (N   2) (N)]
 1
2
= e (N)
((=) If  > e (N), then (14) holds. Therefore, ge is pairwise stable. 
Proof Proposition 5 For simplicity, let us assume two complete components g1 and
g2. For each rm i 2 g1, n1 is the number of active rms in its market, and for each rm j
2 g2, n2 is the number of active rms in its market.
Let us dene  (ni) :=
(ni 1) 2(ni)
(ni 1)+
X
k 6=j;gi=0
(nk)
.
We are interested to know whether  (n1) 7  (n2). That is,
 (n1   1)  2 (n1)
 (n1   1) + (N   n2 + 1) (n2) 7
 (n2   1)  2 (n2)
 (n2   1) + (N   n1 + 1) (n1)
By solving the last expression, we get
(N   n1 + 1) (n1) (n1   1)  2 (n1) (n2   1)  2 (N   n1 + 1) [ (n1)]2 7
(N   n2 + 1) (n2) (n2   1)  2 (n2) (n1   1)  2 (N   n2 + 1) [ (n2)]2
In order to decide the sense of the inequality, we rearrange the above expression into the
following two parts:
(N   n1 + 1) (n1) [ (n1   1)  2 (n1)] 7 (N   n2 + 1) (n2) [ (n2   1)  2 (n2)]
 (n1) (n2   1) 7  (n2) (n1   1)
If n1 > n2, then (i) (N   n1 + 1) < (N   n2 + 1); (ii) by Property 1,  (n1) <  (n2);
(iii) by Property 2, [ (n1   1)  2 (n1)] < [ (n2   1)  2 (n2)].
Therefore,
(N   n1 + 1) (n1) [ (n1   1)  2 (n1)] < (N   n2 + 1) (n2) [ (n2   1)  2 (n2)] (15)
Additionally, if n1 > n2, then, by Property 3,
(n2 1)
(n2)
> (n1 1)(n1)
Hence,
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 (n1) (n2   1) >  (n2) (n1   1) (16)
Therefore, if, n1 > n2, by (15) and (16), then
 (n1   1)  2 (n1)
 (n1   1) + (N   n2 + 1) (n2) <
 (n2   1)  2 (n2)
 (n2   1) + (N   n1 + 1) (n1)
or, in other words, if n1 > n2, then
 (n1) <  (n2)
Proof Proposition 6 By Claim 1, we know that, at  = c, geand gc are pairwise
stable.
Now, we must check, for  = c, whether a rm i has incentive to form an additional
agreement when n 6= 1 and n 6= N .
Therefore, we must verify whether J ij 7 0, that is,
 (n  1)  2 (n) 7 
0@ (n  1) + X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
1A
At  = c, the above expression is
 (n  1)  2 (n) 7

1  2 (2)
 (1)
0@ (n  1) + X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk)
1A
After some calculations, we obtain
2 [ (n  1) (2)   (n) (1)] 7
X
k 6=j;gki=0
 (nk) [ (1)  2 (2)]
By Property 2,  (1)  2 (2) > 0, and by Property 3, [ (n  1) (2)   (n) (1)] < 0.
Therefore, at  = c,
J ij < 0
Proof Proposition 7 The partial derivative of (9) respect to  is:
  (m+ 1)
h
 (N  m+ 1) +
X
 (nk)
i
(1  )m (17)
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That is, as  increases, the incentive to maintain links decreases.
Now, we must check whether (17) is large for rms in large component. Without loss of
generality, assume that there are two components whose sizes are m1 + 1 and m2 + 1, such
that m1 > m2. After some computations, we can verify that, for a su¢ ciently high m, the
following holds:
  (m1 + 1) [ (N  m1 + 1) +m2 (N  m2 + 1)] (1  )m1 <   (m2 + 1) [ (N  m2 + 1) +m1 (N  m1 + 1)] (1  )m2 
Computations for Table 1 ( = 0:04) and Table 2: pairwise stability
Empty Network p () = (1  )2 e 4   2e 5   3e 5

1  (1  )2

p () = 0, Solution is: 6: 491 3 10 2
N=5, three rms isolated and two linked
For a linked rm, we must check the sign of:
p () = (1  )2 e 4   2e 5   3e 5

1  (1  )2

p () = 0, Solution is: 6: 491 3 10 2
For an isolated rm, we must check the sign of:
p () = (1  )2 e 4   2e 5    e 5 + 2e 4 1  (1  )2
p () = 0, Solution is:4: 003 1 10 2
N=5, two rms isolated and one component of three rms linked
For rms in the complete component, we must check the sign of:
p () = (1  ) e 3   2e 4   2e 5
p () = 0, Solution is: e
 3 2e 4
e 3+2e 5 = 0:207 95
For an isolated rm, we must check the sign of:
p () = (1  )2 e 4   2e 5   3e 3

1  (1  )2

p () = 0, Solution is: 1: 453 7 10 2
N=5, one isolated rm and one component of four rms linked For rms in
the complete component, we must check the sign of:
p () = (1  ) e 2   2e 3   e 5
p () = 0, Solution is: e
 2 2e 3
e 2+e 5 = 0:251 71
The isolated rm does not have an incentive to form any agreement for all :
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N=5, two complete components: one of them composed of two rms and the
other one of three rms.
Condition for maintaining a link in the complete component of two rms:
p () = (1  )2 e 4   2e 5   3e 3

1  (1  )2

p () = 0, Solution is:1: 453 7 10 2
Condition for maintaining a link in the complete component of three rms:
p () = (1  ) e 3   2e 4   2e 5
p () = 0, Solution is: e
 3 2e 4
e 3+2e 5 = 0:207 95
N=5, Complete Network Condition for maintaining a link in the complete compo-
nent of ve rms:
p () = (1  ) e 1   2e 2
p () = 0, Solution is: 1
e 1
 
e 1   2e 2 = 0:264 24
Computations for Table 1 ( = 0:04) and Table 3: pairwise strong stability (ss)
Condition ss when  = 0 p (m) = e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)
for m = 2 and for m = 3, p (m) > 0
Condition ss when  6= 0
i.  2  0; 1: 453 7 10 2
for m=2
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 3e 3
p
 
2; 1: 453 7 10 2 = 1: 425 3 10 7
for m=3
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 2e 4
p
 
3; 1: 453 7 10 2 = 2: 703 6 10 3
for m=4
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) e 5
p
 
4; 1: 453 7 10 2 =  2: 884 7 10 2
for m=5
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)
p
 
5; 1: 453 7 10 2 =  0:206 17
ii.  2  1: 453 7 10 2; 4: 003 1 10 2
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for m=3
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 2e 5
p
 
3; 4: 003 1 10 2 =  8: 795 2 10 4
check claim ii. table 2
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)
p
 
3; 4: 003 1 10 2 = 4: 404 4 10 2
p (m;) = e 5 + (m  1) e (5 m+2) + (1  (1  )m) 2e 5
p
 
3; 4: 003 1 10 2 = 4: 492 4 10 2
for m=4
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) e 5
p
 
4; 4: 003 1 10 2 =  4: 218 3 10 2
iii.  2  4: 003 1 10 2; 6: 491 3 10 2
for m=3
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 2e 5
p
 
3; 6: 491 10 2 =  5: 119 10 3
for m=2
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 3e 5
p
 
2; 6: 491 10 2 = 1: 843 8 10 7
iv.  2  6: 491 3 10 2; 0:207 95
for m=3
p (m;) = (1  )m e (5 m+1)   e 5   (m  1) e (5 m+2)   (1  (1  )m) 2e 5
p (3; 0:207 95) =  2: 541 1 10 2
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